By: Jason A. Edwards
Kofi Annan travelled to Rwanda in May of 1998 attempting to repair the image of the United Nations (U.N.) and to heal the fractured political relationship between the two entities. However, the U.N. secretary general largely failed to fulfill his mission
This article analyzes the reasons why Annan’s mea culpa failed. It argues that in Annan’s address before the Rwandan parliament, his rhetorical choices constrained his ability to repair the U.N.’s image and U.N.–Rwandan relations. Specifically, this article demonstrates that the U.N. leader’s nondiscussion of his personal culpability for U.N. action, his democratization of blame for the genocide, and the appearance of personal arrogance created by his language choices hindered his ability to fulfill his mission.
The article concludes with implications for image repair theory, lessons from Annan’s failure for rhetors who apologize for historical wrongdoing, and directions for further research into the phenomena of public apology. The Rwandan genocide stands as one of the 20th century’s greatest examples of human suffering and one of the great failures of the international community to prevent this suffering. Malvern (2000) rightly called this event one of history’s “greatest scandals” (p. 27).
Over the past decade a good deal of research has been put forth to understand this event. Scholars have focused on explaining why the genocide occurred (see Barnett, 2000; Dallaire, 2003; Destexhe, 1995; Malvern, 2000; Prunier, 1995), the current efforts of reconciliation within Rwanda (see Reyntjens, 2004; Sarkin, 2000; Staub, Pearlman, & Miller, 2003; Uvin, 2001), and how to prevent genocide in the future (see Aksar, 2003; Etzioni, 2005; Oberschall, 2000; Totten & Bartrop, 2004). However, there is little to no analysis regarding the apologies issued by international political leaders such as United States president Bill Clinton, United Nations (U.N.) secretary general Kofi Annan, and Belgian prime minister Guy Verhofstadt.
These apologies were attempts to repair the image of their countries and/or organization and served as first steps to try to repair relationships among communities both national and international (see Aksar, 2003; Etzioni, 2005; Oberschall, 2000; Totten & Bartrop, 2004). The apologies for the Rwandan genocide mark one of the few instances where a chorus of political leaders expressed public remorse for the inaction of the international community. Moreover, these apologies are examples of a larger trend in international affairs when political leaders express public remorse and regret for historical transgressions that their nation-states have committed (see Edwards, 2005; Negash, 2002; Suzuki & van Eemeren, 2004; Tavuchis, 1991; Weiner, 2005; Yamazaki, 2005). This contemporary period of mea culpa has been described as an age of apology (Brooks, 1999; Nytagodien & Neal, 2004).[1] Considering there has been little to no analysis surrounding the Rwandan apologetic discourse and its part of a larger political trend, an examination of the apologetic discourse for the Rwandan genocide is warranted. In this article, I focus on Kofi Annan’s 1998 address before the Rwandan parliament.
I argue that Annan attempted to repair the image of the U.N. to Rwandans as well as to begin to mend fences in U.N.–Rwandan relations. I further argue that Annan’s apology was largely a failure because of his rhetorical choices.[2] Specifically, Annan did not except any personal responsibility for the Rwandan genocide. His identification of those responsible was vague and ambiguous. Moreover, his language choices within the address offered the appearance of arrogance to his audience. The U.N. leader’s use of image repair strategies impeded his ability to accomplish his mission. To fully explore these ideas, this article is broken into four parts.
First, I examine the theoretical literature surrounding the form of apologetic discourse known as image repair. In the second section, I initially outline the immediate contextual situation surrounding Annan’s trip to Rwanda and then I conduct an examination of Annan’s address before the Rwandan parliament, paying particular attention to the rhetorical strategies he employed in framing his apology as well as his specific language usage. Third, I discuss the reaction to Annan’s address both within Rwanda and internationally. Finally, I offer implications regarding the secretary general’s apology, image repair, and the rhetoric of public remorse.
APOLOGIA AND IMAGE REPAIR
What does it mean to apologize?
This question has been the subject of numerous essays by communication scholars for the last 3 decades (for examples, see Achter, 2000; Brown, 1990; Downey, 1993; Gold, 1978; Koersten & Rowland, 2004; Ryan, 1982). Typically, apologia is considered a speech of self-defense where rhetors attempt to repair their ethos (Butler, 1971; Ware & Linkugel, 1973). In their public discourse, rhetors may employ a variety of rhetorical postures to repair their credibility.
For example, Ware and Linkugel, in their seminal essay on apologia, argued that there were four postures available to rhetors: denial, the disavowal by the rhetor of participating in particular offensive act; bolstering, where the speaker attempts to identify himself or herself with something viewed favorably by the audience; differentiation, where the rhetor particularizes the charges at hand, moving the audience to a less abstract perspective on the situation; and transcendence, which involves a speaker attempting to endow a situation with a new identity.
Overall, if these rhetorical strategies are employed in a sincere and complete fashion they can help a speaker extricate himself or herself from a particular situation, which would lead to rebuilding the overall image of a rhetor or the community that he or she represents. Since Ware and Linkugel’s (1973) published work, their ideas have largely been expanded into what is known as image repair research. The progenitor of this research is communication scholar William Benoit (1995).
Benoit uses the work on apologia, as well as research from disciplines such as sociology and psychology, to argue that as a goal-related activity, maintaining a favorable image is one of a communicator’s primary goals. Therefore, the primary function of apologia is the repair of one’s image, whether it is an individual, an organization, or a nation-state. Benoit argues that there are five general strategies a speaker may employ:
- Denial has two basic forms: simple denial and shifting the blame. Simple denial basically states that either the rhetor never committed the act or the act did not occur. Shifting the blame, or victimage, involves stating that the other party is responsible for the offensive act.
- Evading responsibility. Here, a rhetor may employ four subcategories. When an orator uses the provocation strategy, she or he argues that the act was a response to previous wrongful behavior that helped to provoke the rhetor. Defeasability suggests that a lack of information or inability to control events caused the act. Accidents means the act occurred because of unforeseeable events. Finally, a rhetor can state that the act was based on good intentions, therefore evading responsibility for the offensive act.
- Reduce offensiveness. This third option includes six subcategories. Bolstering increases the audience’s positive feeling for the rhetor. Minimization reduces the supposed damage of the offense. Differentiation distinguishes the offensive act in question from other greater abhorrent acts. Transcendence places the wrongful act in a broad, positive context to improve the rhetor’s image. Attacking the accuser involves attacking the accuser’s credibility. Finally, compensation attempts to reimburse the victims of the offense.
- Corrective action. Corrective action involves two forms. First, a rhetor can offer to repair the damage caused by the offense. Second, a rhetor may take steps to prevent the recurrence of future offenses.
- Mortification. This final strategy is when the rhetor admits committing the offense, asks for forgiveness, and apologizes for the offensive act. If a rhetor skillfully employs these strategies, or a combination thereof, he or she may be able to start to repair their own image or their organization’s.
In the case of Kofi Annan, I maintain that his Rwandan apology was an attempt to repair the image of the U.N. in the eyes of Rwandans, which would create grounds for rebuilding the overall U.N.–Rwandan relationship. However, as we see, Annan used language that displayed an air of arrogance, hindering his ability to complete his rhetorical task.
KOFI ANNAN’S ADDRESS BEFORE PARLIAMENT
Situational Context
The U.N.–Rwanda relationship has been one of tumult since the international organization became involved in Rwanda.[3] For more than 40 years, from the end of World War I to 1962, Rwanda was ruled by Belgium, which established an oppressive colonial rule and promoted a racist political agenda by classifying Rwandans as either “Tutsi” or “Hutu.” Belgians favored the Tutsi because they were perceived to have more “Caucasian features” (Barnett, 2002, p. 51). They were given preferential treatment, which established a culture of Hutu inferiority toward Tutsis. In 1947, the U.N.’s Trusteeship Council visited Rwanda. They wrote scathing reports about Belgian rule and proposed that Rwanda be given independence (Prunier, 1995). Violent outbreaks from 1959 to 1961 and a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for Rwandan independence led Belgium to declare that Rwanda would receive its independence in 1962 (Barnett, 2002).
In 1962, a U.N.-sponsored election brought a majority Hutu government to power. However, Hutus took revenge upon thousands of Tutsis by driving them out of their homes and into refugee camps, along with killing thousands more. The Tutsis responded with violent campaigns of their own against Hutus in other African nations such as in Burundi and Uganda. Simply put, 1962 marked a year where ethnic violence became a part of life in Rwanda, and the U.N. did nothing to stop it (Duke, 1998a).
Outbreaks of ethnic violence continued until 1973 when Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu himself, came to power in a coup d’etat. Habyarimana made an unspoken bargain with Tutsis: If you stay out of politics you can have a nominally normal life (Barnett, 2002). This unspoken agreement served to abate a good deal of the ethnic violence within the country and was largely maintained until the early 1990s, when large-scale ethnic violence re-erupted. In October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a Tutsi-dominated political and military organization based in Uganda, invaded parts of Rwanda (Prunier, 1995).
Concomitantly, militant Hutu groups within Rwanda started to grow in numbers. These groups advocated the extermination of Tutsis and the overthrow of Habyarimana. For the next 3 years, the RPF and Rwandan government forces fought for control of the countryside. Finally in 1993, with the help of the U.N., the RPF and Rwandan government negotiated an initial cease-fire agreement and ultimately the Arusha Accords in August (Prunier, 1995).
The Arusha Accords were supposed to be the beginning of a peaceful settlement to the Rwandan conflict. Part of the Arusha agreement was that an international peacekeeping force, run by the U.N., was to monitor the cease-fire and to establish democratic elections within the country (Barnett, 2002). Nevertheless, Hutu extremists almost immediately began an open revolt against the accords and actively developed a plan to terrorize the Tutsi minority. In January 1994, Canadian general Romeo Dallaire, who was in charge of U.N. peacekeeping forces in Rwanda, sent a fax to Kofi Annan, who at the time was the head of the U.N. peacekeeping operations. In this initial fax, Dallaire reported that preparations were under way for mass killings, and over the next 3 months, the general continued to send Annan updates of these plans (Dallaire, 2003).
Dallaire’s reports, however, did not convince Annan and the U.N. Security Council to reinforce the peacekeepers or to give them new orders to stop any ethnic conflict. More than 800,000 Rwandans lost their lives over a 100-day period in 1994, as the United Nations had again done nothing to stop ethnic violence within Rwanda. Now the reader should fast-forward to 1998. Kofi Annan, elected in 1996 to the post of U.N. Secretary General, announced that he would visit Rwanda in May 1998. He called his trip a “mission of healing” (Annan, 1998, para. 1).
The centerpiece of this venture was to be an address before the Rwandan parliament, where he was expected to express public remorse for the U.N. inaction during the Rwandan genocide (Duke, 1998b; Maslund, 1998). The goal of the address was to repair the U.N. image and the overall relationship between the international organization and the African nation. However, Annan’s rhetorical situation was made more difficult by two factors prior to his May 7 oration. These factors involved Kofi Annan himself and the rebuke Annan received immediately prior to his address.
The first complication stemmed from accusations concerning Kofi Annan’s direct involvement in preventing the genocide. In the 4 years prior to his Rwandan address, Annan had never acknowledged personal responsibility for any individual mistakes he had made in not preventing the genocide. He had always maintained that he lacked sufficient military might, information, and backing to stop the genocide. Simply put, the U.N. Security Council would not give Annan the tools he needed to stop the bloodshed within the country. However, Annan’s knowledge of events leading up to the genocide came into question.
On May 3, 1998, an article in the New Yorker suggested that Annan had concealed evidence of a plot to commit genocide in Rwanda (Lynch, 1998). On May 5, Annan held a press conference to answer the charges in the New Yorker piece. Annan stated he had “no regrets” in his handling of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Instead, he reiterated his argument that it was the lack of political will within the U.N. Security Council that contributed to the Rwandan violence (Duke, 1998a).
His “no regrets” comment made him appear absolved of the Rwandan genocide, even though he was intimately connected with the event. This absolution was, as we see, in direct contradiction to the expectations of the Rwandan audience, which anticipated that Annan would concede some personal culpability for the genocide. By stating that he had “no regrets” for his handling of the genocide, Annan invited his Rwandan audience to see him as an arrogant leader without remorse. By not taking personal responsibility for the events in Rwanda, the U.N. Secretary General put himself in a difficult rhetorical position.
The second complication arose immediately prior to Annan’s address. Rwandan foreign minister Anastase Gasana issued a 10-point rebuke of both the U.N. and Kofi Annan for its involvement in Rwanda. Gasana stated that throughout its history—including in 1962—the U.N. and Annan had been unresponsive to the needs of Rwandans. Gasana’s remarks were met with resounding applause from members of the Rwandan parliament. His rebuke embodied all of the frustration, disappointment, and anger that Rwandans felt toward Annan and the U.N. All period in 1994, as the United Nations had again done nothing to stop ethnic violence within Rwanda. Now the reader should fast-forward to 1998.
Kofi Annan, elected in 1996 to the post of U.N. Secretary General, announced that he would visit Rwanda in May 1998. He called his trip a “mission of healing” (Annan, 1998, para. 1). The centerpiece of this venture was to be an address before the Rwandan parliament, where he was expected to express public remorse for the U.N. inaction during the Rwandan genocide (Duke, 1998b; Maslund, 1998). The goal of the address was to repair the U.N. image and the overall relationship between the international organization and the African nation.
However, Annan’s rhetorical situation was made more difficult by two factors prior to his May 7 oration. These factors involved Kofi Annan himself and the rebuke Annan received immediately prior to his address. The first complication stemmed from accusations concerning Kofi Annan’s direct involvement in preventing the genocide. In the 4 years prior to his Rwandan address, Annan had never acknowledged personal responsibility for any individual mistakes he had made in not preventing the genocide. He had always maintained that he lacked sufficient military might, information, and backing to stop the genocide.
Simply put, the U.N. Security Council would not give Annan the tools he needed to stop the bloodshed within the country. However, Annan’s knowledge of events leading up to the genocide came into question. On May 3, 1998, an article in the New Yorker suggested that Annan had concealed evidence of a plot to commit genocide in Rwanda (Lynch, 1998). On May 5, Annan held a press conference to answer the charges in the New Yorker piece. Annan stated he had “no regrets” in his handling of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Instead, he reiterated his argument that it was the lack of political will within the U.N. Security Council that contributed to the Rwandan violence (Duke, 1998a).
His “no regrets” comment made him appear absolved of the Rwandan genocide, even though he was intimately connected with the event. This absolution was, as we see, in direct contradiction to the expectations of the Rwandan audience, which anticipated that Annan would concede some personal culpability for the genocide. By stating that he had “no regrets” for his handling of the genocide, Annan invited his Rwandan audience to see him as an arrogant leader without remorse. By not taking personal responsibility for the events in Rwanda, the U.N. Secretary General put himself in a difficult rhetorical position.
The second complication arose immediately prior to Annan’s address. Rwandan foreign minister Anastase Gasana issued a 10-point rebuke of both the U.N. and Kofi Annan for its involvement in Rwanda. Gasana stated that throughout its history—including in 1962—the U.N. and Annan had been unresponsive to the needs of Rwandans. Gasana’s remarks were met with resounding applause from members of the Rwandan parliament. His rebuke embodied all of the frustration, disappointment, and anger that Rwandans felt toward Annan and the U.N. All of the anger and frustration that the Rwandan official expressed were thrust onto Annan, the organization’s leader and its voice.
Annan responded to Gasana by stating, “I did not come here to get into polemics, and I’m sure most of you know the old proverb: The guest is always the prisoner of the host” (“Annan Hits a Wall,” 1998; Duke, 1998a). Annan’s implied message toward Gasana appeared to be, “I have heard what you have said. I am at your mercy concerning what subjects you want me to listen to. However, I do not want to focus on subjects that divide us. Instead, I hope you will focus on what I have to say that may unite us.” When issuing an apology, rhetors often analyze their audience and attempt to adapt themselves to its expectations, especially with a hostile audience such as in Rwanda.[4] Annan’s response to Gasana revealed that he was not going to adapt to his audience. He gave the impression that he had heard the foreign minister’s complaints but he wanted to focus not on areas of division but rather on areas where they might find unity.
By not addressing Gasana’s complaints, Annan suggested that they were not worthy of consideration and planted the seeds of an ineffective address. Taken together—Annan’s denial of personal culpability for his role in the Rwandan genocide, the rebuke he received from Gasana, and his response to that rebuke—the secretary general problematized his mission to repair the image of the U.N.
Annan Speaks Before the Rwandan Parliament
An analysis of Annan’s text before parliament reveals that it contained two distinct parts. The first part involved Annan’s discussion of the Rwandan genocide itself and the inaction of the international community. Here, Annan used the rhetorical strategies of mortification and defeasibility. For the second half of his oration, the secretary general discussed the progress of Rwanda since the genocide and what more was needed for Rwandans to continue to progress. In this part of the address, Annan used corrective action and transcendence. The U.N. leader began his address by dispensing with the normal pleasantries that usually come when a rhetor speaks before a lawmaking body. Instead, Annan (1998) opened with why he had come to Rwanda in the first place. He stated:
I have come to Rwanda today on a mission of healing—to help heal the wounds and divisions that still torment your nation and to pledge the support of the United Nations so that once again we can become a partner and an ally in Rwanda’s search for peace and progress:: : : We will not pretend to know how you must overcome the unimaginable. We can only offer, in humility, the hope and the prayer that you will overcome—and the pledge that we stand prepared to help you recover. We must and we do acknowledge that the world failed Rwanda at that time of evil. The international community and the United Nations could not muster the political will to confront it. The world must deeply repent this failure. (para. 1–4)
Two things should be noticed from these opening lines of Annan’s oration. First, the secretary general’s opening lines were an attempt to rebuild a bridge in the relationship between the U.N. and Rwanda. His use of words such as we, partner, and ally is evidence of this attempt. These words conveyed a message to the Rwandan people that was something to the effect of “we know the United Nations has let you down in the past, but in trying to right the wrongs of the past and moving toward the future, the United Nations will stand with you.”
In doing so, the U.N. leader attempted to create a symbolic sense of unity, which might help to resuscitate the image of the U.N. in the minds of his audience. This resuscitated image can be a first step toward rebuilding relations among communities, including the U.N. and Rwanda. Second and more important, notice how Annan used the strategy of mortification. Recall that mortification is an admittance of wrongdoing, apologizing for the wrongdoing, and asking for forgiveness from the wronged party (Benoit, 1995, p. 78). The secretary general’s mortification occurred at the latter portion of the aforementioned passage when he expressed, “We must and we do acknowledge that the world failed Rwanda at that time of evil” and “the world must deeply repent for this failure.” Here, Annan clearly admitted that the world had committed wrongdoing and must put forth an effort to repent for that failure.
That said, notice that Annan’s strategy of mortification contained no expression of personal responsibility for the Rwandan genocide. This was significant because there was an expectation by Rwandans that Annan would personally take responsibility for U.N. inaction because of his position as the U.N. head of peacekeeping during the genocide (Duke, 1998a). By not personally acknowledging his own faults, Annan dashed the expectations of the Rwandans. In turn, this hindered his ability to speak as a moral voice on behalf of the U.N. In the post-Cold War era, the U.N. secretary general is supposed to serve as a moral voice on the issue of human rights (Ghali, 1996; Russett & Sutterlin, 1991).
However, that voice was damaged by the failure of the U.N. to intervene during the Rwandan genocide. Because Annan was the head of U.N. peacekeeping efforts at the time of the Rwandan genocide and now the U.N. secretary general, he served as that moral voice. Annan was in essence the United Nations. By not admitting personal culpability for the Rwandan genocide, the secretary general could not use the full authority of his office.
Consequently, Annan hindered his ability to repair the image of the U.N. Not only was his mortification deficient because of his lack of personal culpability, but the reader should also notice how Annan phrased what agent(s) were responsible for the Rwandan genocide. The U.N. leader used phrases such as “the world” and the “international community,” never assigning blame for a specific rhetor. This was important because, as Burke (1961) explained, relationships among communities (i.e., the U.N. and Rwanda) are largely symbolic and constructed through language (see also Nytagodien & Neal, 2004).
Language provides order; when a transgression occurs in that relationship, Burke argued, a stain or what he called “guilt” is produced. This guilt must be expunged. One can expunge guilt through a process of admitting responsibility, accepting blame, and asking for forgiveness (mortification). When mortification is used properly, the symbolic relationship can be repaired. Considering that Annan never explicated who was specifically responsible for the Rwandan genocide, it made his apology appear vague and devoid of sincerity. Instead, Annan’s mortification was akin to what Barnett (2002) called the “democratization of blame” (p. 154).
Democratization of the blame entails spreading it among various rhetors, making everyone and no one culpable for the transgression. Annan’s use of generic phrases such as “the international community” and “the world” provided the message that everyone was to blame and no one was to blame for the genocide. This rhetorical tactic’s net result was to dissipate Annan’s rhetorical ability and diminished the likelihood that he would succeed in his mission of healing. As Barnett (2002) put it, “The democratization of blame, in effect, reduced their (Annan and Clinton) own particular culpability to a meaningless fraction…Rwandans were unmoved by the apologies offered by the principal bystanders to the genocide” (p. 154).
By not identifying a specific rhetor, Annan did not expunge the “guilt” in the U.N.–Rwanda relationship. Thus his employment of the strategy of mortification impeded his mission to repair the image of the U.N. and rebuild a relationship between Rwanda and the U.N. As Annan (1998) continued his address, he recapped the ideology of hatred and inhumanity that swept Rwanda and how no one outside of Rwanda had recognized the signs of genocide. As the secretary general explained:
Looking back now, we see the signs, which then were not recognized. Now we know that what we did was not nearly enough—not enough to save Rwanda from itself, not enough to honor the ideals for which the United Nations exists. We will not deny that, in their greatest hour of need the world failed Rwanda. In your people’s agony, an ideology of hate and inhumanity tore the very fabric of existence and made victims of entire people, turning every Tutsi man, woman and child into human prey into a concerted, planned, systematic and methodical campaign of mass extermination. (para. 6–7)
At the beginning of this passage, Annan employed the strategy of defeasibility, where a rhetor pleads a lack of information or control over certain events (Benoit, 1995, p. 76). The secretary general employed this strategy when he stated, “Looking back now, we see the signs, which were not recognized. Now we know that what we did was not nearly enough, not enough to save Rwanda from itself.”
According to the U.N. leader, the world did not recognize the signs of genocide within Rwanda. This runs contrary to the accounts of Canadian general Romeo Dallaire, who, as noted earlier, had publicly stated that he had warned Annan there were grave signs of danger within Rwanda 3 months prior to the genocide. This conflict of narratives impeded the secretary general’s ability to repair the U.N.’s image, because with conflicting accounts of what occurred prior to and during the genocide, it keeps the focus on debating the culpability for the genocide and not the goal of repairing the relationship between the U.N. and Rwanda.
In the second part of his address, Annan (1998) turned to the use of corrective action and transcendence. The use of corrective action involves the rhetor pledging to do something that will help solve the problem(s) of the past (Benoit, 1995, p. 78). In the following passage, Annan attributed this corrective action to the greater role that the Rwandan genocide tribunals were playing in distributing justice for the genocidal crimes in 1994. He stated:
That is why our commitment to your future begins with the pursuit of justice. Here in Rwanda, we are assisting you in your efforts to strengthen your judiciary and your prisons. At the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the last six months have witnessed a fundamental change in the effectiveness of the tribunal. As you all know, the court witnessed an historic moment last week when the former Prime Minister pleaded guilty to genocide. I am also pleased to announce the Security Council of the United Nations last week acted on my recommendations and decided to increase the number of justices at the Tribunal as well as to establish a third chamber. Finally, we are beginning to see the Tribunal working to our and your, satisfaction—and to the satisfaction of the victims of the genocide. It is for them, ultimately, that we seek and we will find justice. (para. 12–13)
Annan’s discussion of the Rwandan International Tribunal on Genocide sent a message to Rwandans that justice was finally being brought to bear on those who perpetrated the crimes of genocide. Yet his use of the first person, a voice he had not used prior, squandered the significance of this new policy initiative. Annan’s use of the first person suggested that he tried to personally take credit for recommendations he made to the Security Council for the Genocide Tribunal. The use of the first person in this way gave the appearance of personal arrogance, because when something was being done to right the wrongs of the Rwandan tragedy he took personal responsibility for a positive step towards justice.
The secretary general did not accept personal blame for the role he played in the Rwandan genocide, but he did accept personal credit when a course of action that is positive for the nation. For his Rwandan audience, this kind of personal credit might have appeared disconcerting because, although Annan demonstrated leadership by pushing for an expanded Rwandan genocide tribunal, he could not demonstrate a similar vein of leadership in outlining specific culprits for the genocide itself. Annan’s (1998) final strategy was transcendence. Transcendence involves taking one act and putting into a different context, perhaps a broader context (Benoit, 1995, p. 77). He maintained:
In the case of Rwanda, you have a monumental challenge before you, I know, but I am confident that with the establishment of the rule of law and with the end of violence, your people can begin to rebuild and restore the process of development which will form the foundation of lasting peace. As you continue to rebuild the fabric of tolerance that is the basis for every society; as you slowly but surely, restore trust and security to your country so that no woman, no man, and no child will fear the night or dread the morning, you should know that we shall stand alongside you. Ultimately, however, you and only you can put an end to the violence. You and only you can find the spirit and the greatness of heart to embrace your neighbors once again. You and only you can show the world that there is life even after genocide, love even after hate, humanity even after evil. Allow me to therefore to conclude by citing the magnanimous words of President Bizimungu upon the mass return of refugees to your country. “The Rwandan people were able to live together peacefully for 600 years, and there is no reason they can’t live together in peace again.” I have no doubt you will. I pray that will be soon. (para. 22–26)
Annan’s message was transcendent in the sense that he put the Rwandan genocide and the progress Rwandans had made into the larger context of the future of Rwanda itself. For Annan, Rwanda must continue to take the lessons of the genocide and build a larger “fabric of tolerance,” which would provide a lesson for the entire world. On its face, this message seemed a wonderful gesture, but notice Annan’s language throughout the passage. Earlier I noted that the use of words like we, partner, and ally emphasized a sense of solidarity and partnership between the U.N. and Rwanda. Annan implied that the U.N. would be an intimate partner of Rwanda in rebuilding their war-torn nation.
However, in the passage just cited, the secretary general switched to pronouns such as you and your instead of we, to describe how Rwandans must rebuild their future. Annan’s message went from one of partnership to one of a greater Rwandan self-reliance. This language switch told his audience that “it is up to ‘you’ to fix your problems and maybe ‘we’ will try to help you along the way.” Baym (2000) noted that the term we can help establish moral authority. The establishment of this authority allows a rhetor to speak on behalf of a particular group.
In the case of Kofi Annan, he represented the U.N., along with the international community. Annan used the notion of “we” several times in the early part of his address, initially re-establishing the moral authority of the U.N. to help Rwanda in the future. However, his language switch to a more self-reliant term, you, served to dissipate the U.N.’s moral authority. His message was no longer one of solidarity between the U.N. and Rwanda. Rather, Annan made it appear as if Rwanda must rebuild on its own, without the help of the U.N. The secretary general gave the impression that the international community was abandoning Rwanda again in its time of need. The pronoun switch from “we” to “you” impeded Annan’s ability to repair the U.N.’s image in the eyes of Rwandans as well as the basic U.N.–Rwandan relationship.
RWANDANS REACT TO ANNAN’S ADDRESS
Although there was no poll opinion data collected to provide an assessment of how Rwandans viewed Annan’s address, press reports paint a picture that they viewed the secretary general’s attempt at a mea culpa as insulting and arrogant. For example, immediately following his address, members of the Rwandan parliament peppered Annan with questions, primarily about his role in restraining peacekeeping forces from preventing the massacres (“Annan Hits a Wall,” 1998).
This line of questioning demonstrated that Annan had not offered any specific explanation of his actions within his address. Later, at a reception for the secretary general, Rwanda’s president, vice president, and prime minister publicly snubbed the U.N. leader by not showing up at the reception (“Annan Hits a Wall,” 1998; Duke, 1998a; Maslund, 1998).
Joseph Bideri, Rwandan President Bizimungu’s spokesperson, summed up the sentiments of lawmakers when he stated, “In his speech to members of parliament, Annan was extremely arrogant, insensitive and insulting to the Rwandan people” (Duke, 1998a, p. 39) and “Annan talked about the necessity for atonement on the part of the Rwandan people, but he was not prepared to atone for the failure of the organization he heads” (“Rwanda Gives U.N.,” 1998, p. A20). The U.N. leader received no better reaction from the Rwandan people.
On May 8, 1 day after his address, Annan met with genocide survivors, who also openly questioned the secretary general about why the U.N. did nothing to help prevent the genocide. One genocide survivor, Charles Butera, argued that Annan’s speech “made us suffer” (Duke, 1998b, p. A21). Another survivor, Alice Karekezi, demanded that Annan needed to explain his personal actions more fully. She angrily stated that “he’s drowning his own responsibility in the collective responsibility of the world… I was expecting to hear the man who was in charge of the peacekeeping operation. We were expecting some apology and he was giving lectures” (McKinley, 1998, p. A9). Clearly, both Rwandan government officials and Rwandans in general considered Kofi Annan’s address to be unsatisfactory.
From this commentary, we can surmise that it was not well received because of the rhetorical choices the secretary general made: He chose not to admit personal culpability, he never mentioned any specific entity in the international community as the culprit, he appeared arrogant in his language choice, and his linguistic shifts toward the end of the speech gave the impression that the U.N. would not be a true partner in rebuilding Rwandan society. All of these choices led to Annan’s inability to repair the U.N.’s image and its overall relationship with Rwanda.
IMPLICATIONS
Kofi Annan’s address before the Rwandan parliament was not a fitting response to the rhetorical situation he faced. His mission to restore the image of the U.N. and to heal U.N.–Rwandan relations was a failure. The U.N. leader’s inability to admit personal culpability, his democratization of the blame, and his appearance of arrogance were a direct cause of his failing. Although his address was not well received, implications can be drawn for image repair theory, rhetors who apologize for historical transgressions and for future research concerning apology and reconciliation.
First, I suggest that “democratization of blame”—where a rhetor spreads the blame equally among parties for any wrongdoing that has been committed—be added as an additional tactic to the theory of image repair. Annan’s democratization of the blame did not work successfully; that does not mean that it should not be added as an additional tactic.
President Bill Clinton, 5 weeks prior to Annan’s address, also went to Rwanda and democratized the blame for the United States’s role in not preventing the genocide (Barnett, 2002). His address was warmly received by many Rwandans (Edwards, 2002). Clinton’s success could have been because of the way he presented the democratization of blame. The president appeared contrite and conciliatory to his Rwandan audience. A rhetor’s tone may have much to do with spreading the blame to various parties may be a successful tactic for rhetors.
Second, scholars who use image repair theory should be aware that there may be gradations of mortification appropriate for different situations. Certainly, Annan did express mortification for the Rwandan genocide, but for Rwandans it was not enough mortification. Perhaps there are some rhetorical situations that require a full acknowledgement of responsibility for one’s actions and an expression of remorse and in others there can be a mere acknowledgement of responsibility.
In 1997, for example, the Clinton White House held a special Rose Garden ceremony to honor the survivors of the Tuskegee Syphilis experiments. In this epideictic situation, Clinton fully acknowledged America’s responsibility for the wrongdoing and expressed remorse for a mistake. The audience’s response to Clinton was overwhelmingly positive (Koesten & Rowland, 2004). Contrast that situation with Clinton’s expression of contrition in Guatemala 2 years later. In March 1999, Clinton was on a Central American tour. One of his first stops was in Guatemala. In this predominantly deliberative situation, while talking about U.S.–Guatemalan relations, the president acknowledged U.S. responsibility for supporting its military junta for more than 30 years, but he was not overtly explicit with his mortification.
However, the president’s expression of remorse was viewed favorably by the vast majority of the media and Guatemalan officials. These two Clinton examples lead me to believe that, depending on the situation, differing levels of mortification may be needed to repair one’s image. It will be up to scholars to determine the various gradations, if any, of appropriate mortification. Third, this analysis offers lessons to rhetors, when faced with a situation such as Annan’s, should apologize fully for their specific actions or for those actions committed by their ancestors. Arendt (1993) reminded us that every generation is burdened by the sins of their parents and blessed by the deeds of their ancestors.
For a relationship between communities to be improved (e.g., the U.N. and Rwanda), injustices that have been committed by one community against another must be discussed fully and apologized for. Part of constructing that mea culpa is that a specific wrongdoer must be identified in the apology itself. Kofi Annan chose not to identify a specific culprit for the failure of the U.N. to involve itself in the Rwandan genocide. Rather, he laid the blame at the feet of everyone. Identifying a specific wrongdoer makes it easier for the “guilt” to be symbolically removed from relationships between communities that have been hurt by historical injustice.
Certainly, rhetors face various political, social, environmental, and cultural constraints when making public statements about historical injustice. These constraints must be taken into account. However, the more forthright a rhetor is, the better opportunity there is to repair the image of the rhetor or what she or he represents and to rebuild the relationship between communities. By identifying a specific culprit, the apologizing rhetor makes it that much easier to start the process of reconciliation between and within communities. Fourth, an account, however brief, of the wrongdoing and its victims should be identified and remembered within the apology.
The remembering of past injustices and their victims offers an imprint on the present (Edwards, 2005). This imprint can influence a specific future course of action. In his address before the Rwandan parliament, Annan provided little remembrance of the genocide itself or its victims. Although he did point out that the genocide was a “methodical campaign of mass extermination,” the U.N. leader’s account merely glossed over it and its victims. By invoking the memories of the genocide and its victims, Annan could have provided more rhetorical support for his calls for reconciliation within Rwanda and between the U.N. and Rwanda.
Finally, apologies for historical injustice are in need of more study. Over the past 15 years there has been an explosion of political, social, and religious leaders apologizing for transgressions that occurred years, decades, even hundreds of years ago. These apologies can be an important rhetorical first step in strengthening and rebuilding fractured political relationships. Research is needed into how the messages themselves are constructed and the various options rhetors may have, as well as the impact they may have on the whole process of reconciliation. Nation-states across the world have created or are proposing to create Truth and Reconciliation Commissions to explore the injustices committed by past regimes.
Certainly, political apologies will be an important facet within that process of reconciliation. Hatch (2003) already explained that an apology from one community to another for a historical injustice is an act of reconciliation in of itself. If that is the case then how does apology fit into the overall reconciliation process? Is there a need for a constant campaign of apology? What are the constraints upon a rhetor who apologizes within these situations and how do those constraints work for and against the speaker? These questions and more are needed in exploring the phenomena of national and international apology.
When Kofi Annan went to Rwanda in 1998 he faced an uphill battle in his mission to mend fences with Rwandans, but his rhetorical choices only further hindered his ability to fulfill his charge. His missteps, however, can provide valuable lessons for other rhetors who apologize for past injustices. In the future there will be more cases of moral crisis. Only time will tell whether the U.N. secretary general can or will serve as a moral voice for human rights and humanity.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2003 National Communication Association Conference in Miami, FL. I thank Kate Archard, Sandra Cleary, Cheryl Edwards, Mary Stuckey, the two anonymous reviewers, and editor Gary Radford for their suggestions in improving this article.
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Source: Atlantic Journal of Communication, 16:88–104, 2008
[1] A number of political leaders have apologized for historical injustices committed against communities within their states or between other populations. For example, in 1997 Bill Clinton apologized to African Americans for the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment. Tony Blair apologized to Irish citizens for Great Britain’s lack of support during the potato famine of the mid-19th century. Japanese prime ministers throughout the 1990s expressed public and private remorse to Chinese, Australian, South Korean, and U.S. leaders for the atrocities they committed prior to and during World War II. For a listing of these apologies, see http://www.upenn.edu/pnc/politicalapologies.html
[2] The reader may wonder why I am examining an apology that was deemed a failure. I believe Annan’s discourse provides important rhetorical lessons for those who engage in attempting to repair the image of their organizations and rebuilding fractured political and social relationships.
[3] For a timeline of the Rwandan genocide, see http://timelines.ws/countries/RWANDA.HTML.
[4] Senator Robert Kennedy faced a similar situation when he addressed Stellenbosch University in South Africa. Kennedy’s audience at Stellenbosch, an all-White university, was hostile to Kennedy’s message of civil rights and equal treatment to all. Kennedy, aware of his fact, adapted his address to include a message of good will and emphasized the like-mindedness between South Africa and the United States. Kennedy’s ability to adapt to his surroundings enhanced his credibility with students and elicited the desired responses from those students (see Rudolph, 1983).