Twenty-four years after the genocide against Tutsi in Rwandan genocide, “Le Monde” returns, supported by documents and testimonies, on this tragic history.
By David Servenay
There are two ways to tell the story: from above or from below. To understand France’s commitment to Rwanda in the spring of 1994, to know in particular if she was an accomplice of the genocidaires Rwandan and if his army supported a regime intoxicated by the murderous madness that killed 800 000 in just three months, it is necessary first, to examine the decisions taken at the highest level of the state, at the heart of power.
And back in time until Wednesday, June 15, 1994, in Paris … That day, a crisis meeting is held at the Elysée Palace, in the presence of François Mitterrand. It’s been almost ten weeks since the genocide began, more precisely since the crash of the plane of the Hutu President Juvenal Habyarimana, shot down over Kigali, the capital, by an unknown commando. His death causes of violent reprisals by the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), the gendarmerie and the Interahamwe Hutu militia. Their targets: moderate Hutu and especially the Tutsi minority, accused of wanting to overthrow the power.
At the time, there was a war between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF, the Tutsi majority rebellion) and the Hutu forces. France has been supporting the Hutu regime for years, but it is questioning the attitude to adopt in the face of these massacres, whose victims are already counted by hundreds of thousands. The Restricted Defense Council organized at the Elysee Palace aims precisely to define the strategy to follow.
It is now possible to know what was said on Wednesday, June 1994, at the presidential palace. The report of the meeting, classified “confidential defense”, was declassified on January 14, 2008 by Nicolas Sarkozy at the request of the investigating judges charged with the investigation for “complicity in genocide” on the operation “Turquoise” conducted by the French army in Rwanda.
This document helps to understand how the authorities handled this sensitive issue during the period of coexistence between François Mitterrand, socialist president, and his right-wing prime minister, Edouard Balladur. “We will start with Rwanda because the situation demands that we take urgent measures,” begins Mitterrand. The Minister of Cooperation, Michel Roussin, then portrays a very gloomy picture: “The situation is not improving.
The massacres continue on the Hutu and Tutsi sides. International public opinion and French opinion are horrified by this spectacle of massacred children and invaded orphanages. “François Léotard, the Minister of Defense, advocates restraint: “We could only do something with the agreement of both parties and international support. But I do not see how we could get the RPF [Tutsi rebellion] agreement and international support. We could only intervene in Hutu area. We would be condemned by the RPF and victims of media manoeuvres. I am very reluctant.” “We must act quickly” Alain Juppé, Minister of Foreign Affairs , he is Will in the war: “We must act quickly, 2 000 to 3 000 men could put an end to the fighting. Should we go further and consider an intervention to exfiltrate populations? “As for Edouard Balladur, it is therefore but cautious: “We cannot, whatever the risks, remain inactive. For moral reasons and not media. I did not ignore the difficulties.”
“François Mitterrand takes the ball with the leap: “I approve this way of seeing. But we could limit our goals. (…) Our effort could be limited to the protection of certain sites, hospitals or schools, without entering into an overall military operation that would be difficult because there is no continuous front. “As the meeting ends, François Léotard asks: “Mr. Chairman, am I to understand that this operation is a decision or that it is only a matter of studying the possibility? “François Mitterrand concludes, cutting: “It is a decision of which I take the responsibility. (…) What I approve is a quick and focused intervention, but not a generalized action. You are the master of methods, Admiral.”
Admiral, the “master of methods” is Jacques Lanxade, the Chief of Staff of the French Army. The same day, this one presents to his minister, Mr. Léotard, a text “confidential defense” entitled Memory on a military operation in Rwanda. His goal: to convince him of the need for this “humanitarian intervention”. A by believing this paper paid to the court record which Le Monde has learned in its entirety, the admiral is aware of walking on eggshells. “It must be emphasized that this operation is delicate,” he writes, “that it will require significant means of support, and that it will be necessary to accept significant risks for our troops.
“In addition to the “risks” of the terrain, there is potential political shaking. Edouard Balladur is aware that Rwanda is a “bee-eater”. Since arriving in Matignon in the spring of 1993, he has been reluctant to engage in any military engagement in Africa . His ministers Léotard and Roussin are equally circumspect.
The goal, “to stop the interethnic massacres” On the side of the Quai d’Orsay, Alain Juppe has for its part rallied to the interventionists of the Elysee Palace, horrified that it is by the scale of the killings of which he receives reports every day more circumstantial. It must be said that around François Mitterrand, a handful of men – the secretary general of the Elysee, Hubert Vedrine, the chief of staff, Christian Quesnot, and the adviser Africa Bruno Delaye – wishes to continue an effort war since October 1990 in support of the FAR against rebels of the RPF (*).
These men of the presidential entourage are then persuaded to fight against the extension of “Tutsiland” (the area of domination of this ethnic group), perceived as an Anglo-Saxon conspiracy against the meadow of France in the region. Paul Kagame, the strongman of the RPF, was he not trained in the United States? Is he not the protégé of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, hatched by Washington?
According to the report of Admiral Lanxade, the operation must “stop the interethnic massacres” and display the “neutrality” of France with regard to “each party involved” . To remain “neutral” in a genocide, that is a first dilemma, thus presented in the chapter “Situation”: “The civil war, awakened by the assassination of the Rwandan president on April 6, 1994, resulted in a real genocide perpetrated by certain units of the Rwandan military (presidential guard) and by Hutu militia against the Tutsi minority of the population or some moderate Hutu cadres. “Obviously, the planners of the French army are therefore familiar with the situation on the ground. They detail it in two paragraphs with eloquent titles: “Who are the slaughterers? And “Who are the slaughtered?
At the staff, we know who kills who. But do we really know who to support? Jacques Lanxade plays a decisive role in these hours when a choice is required. First sailor appointed Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, he led (1989-1991) the special staff of President Mitterrand. Both understand each other perfectly. François Mitterrand never gave a precise directive, recalls the admiral, met March 2 at his Paris home. Basically, he felt that you needed to know what you had to do. As I was on the same line as him, I had a great freedom of action. “If the president is wary of the military (and more of the police), he has confidence in this man who is well versed in diplomatic convolutions. After his military career, Mr. Lanxade will also benefit from a rare promotion: he will become ambassador of France in Tunisia (1995-1999). “The action of yesterday” and the “inaction of today”.
Meanwhile, in the spring of 1994, Mitterrand delegates to him all military operations, including political contacts necessary for the performance of his duties. In a way, his role is more important than that of the Minister of Defense in the conduct of the war. As a connoisseur of Rwandan issues, Mr. Lanxade offers three options to intervene. The selected one passes by the airport of Goma, in Zaire (the present Democratic Republic of Congo) neighbor. Its objective: to invest and control the zone held by the FAR (the genocidal forces), about half of the country. In appearance, it is indeed a humanitarian operation. In reality, its goals, as mentioned in the file, are broader: “Stop the massacres, save the refugees and stop the extension of the conflict. “And Lanxade add, cryptic: “From the French point of view, we must avoid that we are alleged and the action yesterday and inaction today.” Under this formula lies the ambiguity of the French politics in Rwanda.
Saving power “friend”
“An initial action will be conducted on the Cyangugu area before a possible commitment to Kigali,” he said in the document of Admiral Lanxade. The ultimate military objective is therefore the capital, where RPF rebels tighten their grip on government forces every day. In seeking to go to Kigali, the French General Staff and the close circle of François Mitterrand intend above all to freeze the fronts, and at the same time avoid the collapse of the FAR and the militia; in short, prevent the victory of the rebels.
The bottom line is not to stop the genocide: Paris knows that the bulk of the massacres have already been committed in the capital and that there are almost no Tutsis to save. . The important thing seems to be the safeguarding of “friend” power. To carry out this mission, the Admiral has an asset: the Special Operations Command (COS), placed under his direct responsibility. Composed of the elite special forces (paratroopers of the navy, GIGN, commandos of air and navy …), this new body of the French army has the role of “opening the doors” before an operation. Clearly, do intelligence on the ground, but also conduct discrete actions commandos.
From the beginning, “Turquoise” is a schizophrenic operation: to stop the massacres on one side and, at the same time to help the regime of the executioners. “Regular” soldiers will protect the threatened civilians, while the “irregular” special forces will do the dirty work that is, help the government against the rebels.
The first officer to land on the Goma runway on June 19 – even before the UN Security Council gives the green light to Operation Turquoise – is named Jacques Rosier, “Romuald” after his name of code. He is a skydiver, boss of the COS detachment. Ten men out of the 222 planned accompany him.
Former head of the 1st RPIMa, one of the most titled officers of the army, Rosier has already to his credit two missions in Rwanda, where he fought the RPF Kagame in 1992 and 1993. He knows by heart the senior Rwandan officers; some are even his friends. “Between the 20th and the 22nd of June, while waiting for the rest of my units, I made different contacts,” he explains to the police who interrogate him, on September 13, 2007, as part of an investigation for “complicity in genocide” on the complaint of six survivors of the massacres, who accuse the French military hierarchy of “complicity in genocide” and “complicity in crime against humanity”.
French soldiers alongside Rwandan soldiers
Among the colonel’s “contacts” are various ministers of the genocidal government, including that of the defense, and the main military leaders of the routed national army. If he does not lie to the investigators, Mr. Rosier does not say the whole truth either. In his end-of-mission report, he gave a clue on some aspects of his work: “Being still alone in the area, the detachment also carried out some extractive missions in the Gisenyi region [Rwandan city located opposite Goma, on the other side of the border].“Without further clarification of these” extraction “.
Before the arrival in the region of the rest of the troops and the press, Rosier has a few days to extract “bells”, French soldiers having spent the period of the genocide with their Rwandan counterparts. How many are they? “Ten,” according to General Quesnot, interviewed in 2006 by Olivier Lanotte, a Belgian researcher who for his part advances the figure of a “twenty or so advisers and technicians, all volunteers.“
Information travels to New York, according to New Zealand ambassador to the UN Colin Keating. On June 21, he wrote to the authorities of his country: “An interesting piece of information we learned from the secretariat this afternoon is that the RPF claims that French military advisers remained in the country and that they formed certain Hutu militias. Some are in the countryside, but others are in Kigali.”
What was the mission of these ghosts? Did they advise ministers, trained soldiers? Or participated in the operations? Or do real-time intelligence? It is impossible to have certainties, except that they have supported and accompanied the FAR since the beginning of the massacres. For its part, the Directorate General of External Security (DGSE, foreign intelligence service) has set up a separate device, consisting of illegals, infiltrated under cover to the center of Kigali to inform their hierarchy in Paris.
Deliveries of “defensive” weapons
Colonel Rosier has other secret objectives, in the continuity of French politics in this country. Among them, arms deliveries. Here again, the subject is so delicate that General Quesnot, stationed at the Elysee Palace, sends a note to the President of the Republic on June 25, 1994: “The total cost of equipment and ammunition ceded to Rwandan armies and gendarmerie over the last three years amounted to 54.8 million francs. (…) The weapons and ammunition given by France consisted exclusively of heavy war material of a defensive nature designed to stop the RPF offensive. We did not deliver any individual weapon which could be used later in the massacres (and a fortiori, no machete). “
Here, General Quesnot plays on the words and on the “defensive nature” of the material, because besides the artillery (105mm guns, radars and shells), France provided machine guns (12.7 mm) and their cartridges. Other countries were asked to provide the rest: Egypt, Israel and South Africa delivered mortar shells and rocket launchers to Kigali. Finally, the list of the General is not entirely exhaustive, as is shown by the archives of the Military Cooperation Mission, annexed to the report of the Rwanda Information Mission of 1998.
In 1992 alone, 20 000 anti-personnel mines and 700 000 cartridges of 5.56 mm were authorized for export, without counting transceivers, night vision devices and parachutes. In 1993: 250 9mm pistols, 530 assault rifles, thousands of 120mm mortar rounds.
On May 17, 1994, the UN ended up decreeing an arms embargo. Therefore, supply of military equipment can meet the “complicity in crimes against humanity.” On several occasions, in May and June, emissaries of the Kigali regime nevertheless come to Paris to present their grievances. They need weapons, including to exterminate the Tutsi. This is one of the ideas received on this genocide: it would be mainly the work of militia armed with machetes. False: the machetes are the cause of the death of 36% of the recorded victims. Most of the group killings in churches, schools and hills were made by uniformed men with grenades, rifles and automatic weapons. The militia took charge of “finishing the job”.
Mercenaries and arms dealers
When the news comes out of the embargo, it becomes crucial for the genocidaires to organize parallel arms supply circuits. According to the humanitarian organization Human Rights Watch, at least five FAR shipments were landed at Goma airport between May and July 1994. The mercenary circuits are also used. The former gendarme of the GIGN and Elysee Paul Barril and the famous mercenary Bob Denard are solicited. Barril signs a contract for assistance and service for more than a million dollars: it will provide many mercenaries, but not the weapons and ammunition yet planned in quantity.
Arms traffickers are also active behind the scenes. Considered as the brains of the genocide, Colonel Théoneste Bagosora orchestrates everything. Cargo planes unload at Goma their arms shipments, immediately transferred to Gisenyi on the Rwandan side, then to Hutu refugee camps in Zaire after the FAR debacle. However, Gisenyi and Goma airport are entirely under the control of the device “Turquoise”: failing to initiate, the French army therefore close their eyes to these traffics.
At the same time, one of the goals remains the capital, Kigali. General Quesnot, at the Elysee, and the highest officials of the French army are convinced that “the RPF does not have the military means to control the entire country.” This analysis is a major mistake: it underestimates the speed of progression of the rebels.
On June 30, just when the French system is ready to take action, Paris resolves to abandon the option Kigali. Questioned by Le Monde, Admiral Jacques Lanxade contests today this presentation of the facts, despite the accumulation of clues. For him, “there was never any question of going to Kigali. We could not go, he says, it was getting in the middle of the fighting.
French soldiers captured?
The table of the French strategy would be incomplete without the list of incidents between the COS and the rebels of Kagame: clashes, ambushes … Among the shadows of the operation “Turquoise”, thus appears an episode hitherto unknown: the capture in July 1994 of French soldiers by RPF troops. The episode is revealed by Paul Kagame himself, in the documentary Inkotanyi Christophe Cotteret, scheduled April 10 on Arte.
In this film, the one who is now president of Rwanda, tells how his men trapped the COS, around July 15, on the edge of the safe humanitarian zone (ZHS). “We captured twenty-three French soldiers, we surrounded them,” said Kagame. They were practically used to haggling, saying, “This is our country and we are going to enter this territory, whether you like it or not. So, if you agree to let us in, because this is our country, I have no problem letting these people [COS men] go away. “It really helped us solve the problem.” Very quickly, the Elysee would have accepted the exchange of these prisoners against the commitment of to restore ZHS on 18 August, leaving the RPF free to take control of the territory.
The capture of French soldiers has never been officially recognized. Admiral Lanxade denies it. In “off”, several French officers confirm its reality while qualifying it as “non-event”. The embarrassment of one and the other betrays a shameful truth: since the justice seeks to pierce the secrets of “Turquoise”, the discord reigns between the former brothers in arms.
(*) MM. Delaye, Quesnot and Vedrine have always considered that France in Rwanda had tried to obtain, through negotiations, a “power sharing” between the “various actors of the Rwandan scene”.
Source: Les secrets de la France au Rwanda: les ambiguïtés de l’opération « Turquoise » of 15th March 2018 through Google Translate